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FAMILIES ARE MORE POPULAR THAN FEMINISM: 
EXPLORING THE GREATER JUDICIAL SUCCESS OF 
FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE LAWS 
 
KATE WEBBER*
“Rather than focusing on prohibiting discrimination on the basis of gender, one 
might ask what work should look like.”1
INTRODUCTION
Two federal employment laws advance women’s position in the workplace, but one 
has been much more successful than the other when employee plaintiffs seek to enforce 
their rights in court. First, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) prohibits 
sex discrimination in the workforce. Plaintiffs seeking to enforce this statute experience 
one of the lowest success rates of any civil cause of action.2 On the other hand, the Family 
Medical Leave Act of 1993 (“FMLA”) provides employees the right to take leave for the 
birth of a child, medical or family care, and prohibits discrimination against those who 
use their leave rights. Employees who bring cases under the FMLA have nearly double 
the chance of winning in court compared with anti-discrimination statutes such as Title 
VII.3 The FMLA is more successful despite the fact that, like Title VII’s sex discrimination 
prohibitions, the FMLA benefits women in particular, providing a key support to their 
workplace advancement. This Article examines the potential causes of the different 
litigation success rates of Title VII and the FMLA. In doing so, the Article sheds light on 
*  Associate Professor of Law, Nova Southeastern University Shepard Broad College of Law.
1  Catherine R. Albiston, Institutional Inequality and the Mobilization of the Family and Medical 
Leave Act, 106 (2010).
2  Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs in Federal Court: From 
Bad to Worse?, 3 Harv. L. & Pol’y Rev. 103, 127 (2009) (Between 1979 and 2006, the plaintiff win rate in 
federal court for “jobs cases” (15%) was dramatically lower than for “nonjobs cases” (51%)) [hereinafter 
Clermont & Schwab, From Bad to Worse].
3  Katie R. Eyer, That’s Not Discrimination: American Beliefs and the Limits of Anti-Discrimination Law, 96 
Minn. L. Rev. 1275, 1352 (2012) (FMLA claimants win pretrial adjudications at roughly four times the rate 
of discrimination litigants, and prevail at trial in roughly sixty percent of cases) (citing Kevin M. Clermont & 
Stewart J. Schwab, How Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare in Federal Court, 1 J. Empirical Legal 
Stud. 429, 445 (2004) [hereinafter Clermont & Schwab, How Plaintiffs Fare]).
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judicial decision-making in employment law and suggests avenues for advocates seeking 
to change women’s work life for the better.
Understanding what makes the FMLA successful is of current import because there are 
many proposed and recently-enacted laws, which, like the FMLA, provide leave benefits 
to workers. For example, a number of states and municipalities have passed laws to expand 
employees’ ability to take leave from work to care for family or medical issues.4 The 
federal Department of Labor has launched an initiative to support these state and local 
efforts.5 News coverage further reflects a cultural concern with the issue and an increasing 
awareness of how employees’ limited rights to take leave from work prevent them from 
addressing their personal or family needs.6 Given the momentum and interest in leave-
based legal reform, it is appropriate to explore how leave laws will be received in the courts 
when the inevitable need to enforce them arises.
This Article uses three theoretical frameworks—political, psychological, and 
institutional—to explore how and why cases under the FMLA, and by extension other leave 
laws, can escape the dismal litigation fates of the anti-discrimination law. Political science 
theories suggest that the FMLA is more successful because the statute is less controversial 
and inspires a weaker ideological response in judges than anti-discrimination laws. The 
theory of cultural cognition suggests that the FMLA is more successful because it does not 
trigger the strong unconscious resistance associated with discrimination claims. Finally, 
theories of institutional inequality indicate that the FMLA is more successful because it can 
undermine the traditional norms of the ideal worker in ways that the anti-discrimination 
laws cannot. Overall, all three theories point to a consistent explanation for why FMLA 
claims have better outcomes. Namely, leave laws such as the FMLA have many of the 
characteristics of a neutral benefit statute, in contrast to anti-discrimination laws’ focus 
on protected classes such as race or gender. Ultimately, understanding what differentiates 
the outcomes between these related statutes will suggest the best avenues for advocates of 
gender equality in the workplace.
Part I of the Article introduces the FMLA and other laws affecting an employee’s ability 
4  See, e.g., Cal. Unemp. Ins. Code Ann. § 2601 (West 2015) (providing for paid family leave).
5  We’re Ready to Lead on Leave, U.S. Dep’t Lab. Blog (Jan. 17, 2015), http://blog.dol.gov/2015/01/15/
were-ready-to-lead-on-leave/ [https://perma.cc/SN33-VSHA].
6  See, e.g., Claire Cain Miller, New Momentum in Paid Leave, in Business and in Politics, N.Y. Times, June 
22, 2015, at B1; Paula Span, Caregivers Must Sometimes Sacrifice Their Careers, N.Y. Times, Dec. 5, 2015, 
at D5.
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to take leave for family care responsibilities. Part II.A looks at the political science models 
of judicial decision-making and asks whether leave laws such as the FMLA succeed because 
they are less controversial, or less ideological, than protected class-based statutes. Part II.B 
looks at the theories of cultural cognition to determine whether they can explain leave laws’ 
relative success. Finally, Part II.C explores the framework of institutional inequality, or 
the way internalized notions of the ideal worker prevent laws such as Title VII from truly 
transforming the position of women within the workplace. The Article concludes with the 
implications for advocates seeking to reform the workplace.
I. Background
To understand why and how leave laws such as the FMLA may be a better tool for 
workplace equality, it is necessary to first understand what leave laws regulate, where these 
laws fit within the context of employment law, and how courts respond to leave laws in 
particular. All of these statutes attempt to mitigate the conflict between work and family 
needs by requiring employers to offer benefits to their workers.
A. The Family Medical Leave Act and Expanded Leave Benefits
A variety of leave laws provide employees with the ability to take time off from work to 
care for family or themselves. At the federal level, the FMLA is the most important statute, 
granting leave rights to millions of workers nationwide.7 The FMLA requires employers 
with fifty or more employees to provide covered workers up to twelve weeks of unpaid, 
job-protected leave: for the birth or adoption of a child, for their own serious medical 
condition, or to care for a close relative with a serious medical condition.8 Only employees 
who have worked for at least a year, and 1,250 hours within the past year, can qualify.9 
The employee who takes leave must be restored to the same or equivalent position and the 
employer cannot retaliate against the employee for taking the leave.10 
 
7  29 U.S.C. § 2601.
8  29 U.S.C. §§ 2611(4), 2612(a)(1). In 2008, the FMLA was amended to provide two types of military family 
leave: (i) up to twelve workweeks of job-protected leave for any “qualifying exigency” arising out of the active 
duty or call to active duty status of a spouse, son, daughter, or parent; and (ii) up to twenty-six workweeks of 
job-protected leave in a “single 12-month period” to care for a covered service member with a serious injury or 
illness. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, 29 USC § 2612(3).
9  29 U.S.C. § 2611(2)(A).
10  29 U.S.C §§ 2614(a)(1), 2615(a)(2).
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State laws also provide crucial leave rights to workers, and some provide expanded 
benefits beyond what the FMLA offers. For example, in response to the need for 
compensation and time for family care, four states, California, New Jersey, Rhode Island, 
and New York, have enacted laws providing for at least a few weeks of paid family leave.11 
The absence of paid leave is one of the most widely criticized aspects of the FMLA.12 
Relatedly, several states have enacted laws requiring paid, short-term sick leave.13 The 
11  Cal. Unemp. Ins. Code Ann. § 2601 (West 2015); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 43:21-25 (West 2015); R.I. Gen. 
Laws Ann. §§ 28-41-34–28-41-38 (West 2015). California’s paid leave statute was effective in 2004 and 
provides for up to 6 weeks of paid leave in the amount of up to 55% of wages (the wage replacement is 
capped). Cal. Unemp. Ins. Code Ann. § 3301 (West 2015). In 2009, New Jersey’s paid family leave law 
became effective; it provides for up to 6 weeks of paid leave in the amount of 2/3 of weekly salary (the wage 
replacement is capped). N.J. Stat. Ann. § 43: 21-38 (West 2015). In 2013, Rhode Island passed a paid family 
leave law providing for 4 weeks of paid family leave of approximately 60% of wages (the wage replacement is 
capped). 28 R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 28-41-34 (West 2015). In April 2016, New York enacted a paid family leave 
law that when fully implemented will provide 12 weeks of paid leave at 67% of wages. N.Y. Workers’ Comp. 
Law § 204 (McKinney 2016). President Obama also signed a Presidential Memorandum granting federal 
employees 6 weeks of paid parental leave. Modernizing Federal Leave Policies for Childbirth, Adoption and 
Foster Care to Recruit and Retain Talent and Improve Productivity, WhiteHouse.Gov (Sept. 7, 2015), https://
www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/01/15/presidential-memorandum-modernizing-federal-leave-
policies-childbirth-ad [https://perma.cc/DGT8-UK5B].
12  Nicole Buonocore Porter, Finding a Fix for the FMLA: A New Perspective, a New Solution, 31 Hofstra 
Lab. & Emp. L.J. 327, 343–44 (2014) (noting that the most commonly made suggestion for improving the 
FMLA is to provide for paid leave). Both Democratic presidential candidates have called for paid family leave. 
See Hillary Clinton, https://www.hillaryclinton.com/issues/paid-leave/ [https://perma.cc/T2WH-6KP3] (last 
visited June 26, 2016); Bernie Sanders, https://berniesanders.com/issues/real-family-values/ [https://perma.
cc/363Y-DB25]. Every other industrialized democracy offers paid leave. Ann Bartel, et al., Paid Family Leave, 
Fathers’ Leave-Taking, and Leave-Sharing in Dual-Earner Households 5 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 21747, 2015). The failure to do so in the United States is particularly punitive to lower-
income workers who cannot afford time off without pay. See Porter, supra note 12, at 340. 
13  A Better Balance, Overview of Paid Sick Time Laws in the United States, 1–4 (2015), http://www.
abetterbalance.org/web/images/stories/Documents/sickdays/factsheet/PSDchart.pdf [https://perma.cc/VT8Q-
JSX3] [hereinafter Overview of Paid Sick Time]. California’s sick leave law, passed in September 2014, 
provides up to 24 hours of paid sick time. Cal. Lab. Code § 246 (West 2015). In Massachusetts, the sick 
leave law passed November 2014, and provides workers with up to 40 hours of paid sick time a year. Mass. 
Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 149, § 148C(d)(4) (West 2015). Connecticut’s sick leave law applies to employers with 
50 or more employees and provides for up to 40 hours of paid sick leave per year. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 
31-57r–31-57w (West 2015). In Oregon, workers whose employers have at least 10 employees can earn up to 
40 paid hours of sick time per year. S.B. 454, 78th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2015). Smaller employers 
must provide job-protected sick leave of 40 hours a year, but are not required to pay for this time. Id. All of 
these states allow employees to use the time to care for a close family member as well as their own illness. 
Overview of Paid Sick Time, supra note 13, at 1–4.
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federal government has also made some efforts to offer paid sick leave.14 The nearly forty 
million workers who have no sick leave benefits must either work while sick or risk the 
financial harm of losing the day’s wage or even losing their job for failing to appear for 
work.15 Paid sick leave is recognized as an important supplement to the FMLA for low-
wage workers because it provides for time off for the less serious illnesses that the FMLA 
does not cover.16
In addition to these enacted leave laws, legislators and advocates have offered other 
bills that address the conflict between work and family needs. There are efforts to enact 
paid family leave at the state level in New York, Washington, Connecticut, and New 
14  On September 7, 2015, President Obama signed an executive order “requiring federal contractors to 
provide up to seven days of paid sick leave a year.” President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President at 
Greater Boston Labor Council Labor Day Breakfast (Sept. 8, 2015); Fact Sheet: Helping Middle-Class Families 
Get Ahead by Expanding Paid Sick Leave, WhiteHouse.Gov (Sept. 7, 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/
the-press-office/2015/09/07/fact-sheet-helping-middle-class-families-get-ahead-expanding-paid-sick [https://
perma.cc/9NQ2-HHAD]. See also Peter Baker, Obama Orders Federal Contractors to Provide Workers Paid 
Sick Leave, N.Y. Times, Sept. 7, 2015, at A20 (noting the contractor sick leave order must first go through a 
public comment period and will apply only to new federal contracts starting in 2017, but “the White House 
hopes it will set a standard that will prod lawmakers, private employers, and state and local governments 
to expand their leave policies.”). President Obama also signed a Presidential Memorandum directing 
federal agencies to advance up to six weeks of paid sick leave for parents with a new child. Presidential 
Memorandum—Modernizing Federal Leave Policies for Childbirth, Adoption and Foster Care to Recruit and 
Retain Talent and Improve Productivity, WhiteHouse.Gov (Jan. 15, 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/2015/01/15/presidential-memorandum-modernizing-federal-leave-policies-childbirth-ad [https://
perma.cc/HW5F-7RJR]. A proposed federal law, the Healthy Families Act, would allow millions of workers 
to earn up to seven days of paid sick leave per year. Healthy Families Act, H.R. 1286, 113th Cong. (2013). 
Specifically, workers in businesses with at least 15 employees could earn 7 job-protected, paid sick days and 
use them to recover from their own illnesses, access preventive care, provide care to a sick family member, or 
attend school meetings related to a child’s health condition or disability. Id. Workers at businesses with fewer 
than 15 employees could earn 7 job-protected but unpaid sick leave days to be used for the same purposes. Id.
15  “Workers without paid sick days—nearly 40 percent of the private-sector workforce—are among the least 
economically secure, and an illness forces them to take time away from work without pay and puts them at 
risk of losing their job. Lack of paid sick time means that an illness can potentially cost a family thousands of 
dollars in income and jeopardize their ability to afford food, rent, health insurance, and many of the other basic 
goods that are essential to well-being. Just three and a half days of missed work because of illness is equivalent 
to an entire month’s groceries for the average family.” Elis Gould et al., Econ. Policy Inst., The Need for 
Paid Sick Days 1 (2011). 
16  Porter, supra note 12, at 340; Katharine B. Silbaugh, Is the Work-Family Conflict Pathological or Normal 
Under the FMLA? The Potential of the FMLA to Cover Ordinary Work-Family Conflicts, 15 Wash. U. J.L. & 
Pol’y 193, 193–94 (2004).
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Hampshire.17 Ongoing legislative efforts seek to provide paid leave on a national basis.18 
Various municipalities have similarly proposed laws to require employers to provide paid 
or at least job-protected sick leave benefits.19 
B. The Context of Leave Laws
All of the existing, new and proposed leave laws offer benefits for workers, but to be 
fully effective, courts must enforce these statutes.20 Benefits are not meaningful if employers 
may deny them without penalty. The question of enforcement is particularly relevant here 
because with other comparable employments statutes, namely the anti-discrimination laws, 
plaintiffs routinely lose their cases. Thus, the next steps for understanding the impact of 
leave laws is to place these statutes within a broader legal context, comparing them to the 
less successful employment statutes. 
1. Context of Leave Laws: The FMLA Straddles Two Types of Employment 
Laws 
Federal statutes and regulations govern the relationship between employers and 
employees in a number of different ways. The National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) 
sets standards and protections for unionization efforts in the workplace.21 Other federal 
employment laws provide certain minimum standards of employee treatment, prohibiting 
17  Overview of Paid Sick Time, supra note 13; The Need For Paid Family Leave, A Better Balance, 
http://www.abetterbalance.org/web/ourissues/familyleave [https://perma.cc/N93Y] (last visited June 26, 
2016). The federal Department of Labor’s “LeadOnLeave” initiative includes an effort to encourage states and 
cities to enact paid leave laws. We’re Ready to Lead on Leave, supra note 5. The initiative also proposes $2 
billion in new funds to support states’ efforts to develop paid family and medical leave and $1 million for state 
and municipality feasibility studies into paid leave programs. Id. 
18  In 2015, Senator Kirsten Gillibrand and Representative Rosa DeLauro introduced the Family Medical 
Insurance Leave Act (FAMILY Act) which would provide up to twelve weeks of paid leave to care for a new 
child or seriously ill family member. Family and Medical Insurance Leave Act (the “FAMILY Act”), S. 1810, 
113th Cong. (2013). This paid leave bill would create an insurance program funded by contributions from both 
workers and employers and administered through the Social Security Administration. Id. All workers who 
would be eligible for Social Security disability would be covered. Id.
19  Overview of Paid Sick Time, supra note 13, at 4–9.
20  Rafael Gely & Timothy D. Chandler, Maternity Leave Under the FMLA: An Analysis of the Litigation 
Experience, 15 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol’y 143, 145 (2004) (“[T]o a large measure, the ultimate effect of a statute 
depends on litigation outcomes.”).
21  National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1935). 
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unsafe work environments in the Occupational Health and Safety Act (“OSHA”)22 and 
setting rules on child labor, minimum wage, and overtime in the Fair Labor Standards 
Act (“FLSA”).23 However, these benefit laws do differentiate among workers in some 
respect. For example, the FLSA requires overtime only for exempt employees with 
different impacts on different classes of workers24 and many of the NRLA protections only 
apply to employees who belong to a union.25 These employment laws may nonetheless be 
distinguished from a second grouping of federal employment laws that base protections on 
an employee’s membership in certain identity-based or inherent, “protected classes.” Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis 
of race, sex, color, national origin and religion.26 The Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act prohibits discrimination on the basis of age, and the Americans with Disabilities Act 
prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability.27
The FMLA and analogous leave laws are a hybrid of these benefit based and protected-
class based employment laws.28 On the one hand, leave laws resemble the first category and 
appear as neutral benefit laws. Although leave laws distinguish among employees, they do 
so not based on inherent characteristics such as race or gender, but rather status as caregiver 
or suffering from temporary physical illness.29 Anti-discrimination laws grant workers a 
right to sue their employers for discriminatory employment actions such as failure to hire, 
failure to promote, or termination.30 The FMLA and related leave laws, however, require 
the provision of direct benefits within the workplace.31 In this respect, leave laws mirror 
22  Occupation Safety and Health Act (OSHA), 29 U.S.C. § 651 (1970).
23  Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. § 201 (2007).
24  29 U.S.C. § 207.
25  29 U.S.C. § 158.
26  Civil Rights Act of 1964, 29 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
27  Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1991). Americans with Disabilities 
Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2008).
28  Silbaugh, supra note 16, at 215 (The FMLA “unlike Titles VII and IX has as its purposes both an equality 
component and a family welfare component.”).
29  See, e.g., Eyer, supra note 3, at 1280–81. See also Porter, supra note 12, at 333–34 (proponents of the 
FMLA designed it to be gender neutral to avoid “special treatment stigma” against women). 
30  See, e.g., Title VII, 29 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
31  29 U.S.C. § 2612.
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statutes like OSHA or the FLSA which also mandate the standards within the workplace.32 
An employee should not need to sue in order to receive the benefits of the law; rather, 
employers must generally comply. Lawsuits are in the outlier circumstances of failure to 
provide required benefits.
On the other hand, a deeper analysis reveals that leave laws do not fit quite so 
thoroughly into the same category as the FLSA or OSHA. First, by providing leave for 
an employee illness, leave laws overlap with the ADA and other such protected class-
based laws that address individuals with disabilities. Moreover, although gender neutral 
in statutory language, the origin and use of leave laws closely tie these laws to gender. 
Activists and scholars long recognized that women’s advancement in the paid economy 
required some means of addressing their greater role in childbirth, childcare, and other 
caretaking.33 The movement to create workplace leave was and continues to be driven in 
large part by a desire to improve women’s position in the workplace.34 For example, two 
of the stated purposes of the FMLA are “minimizing employment discrimination based on 
sex” and “promoting the goal of equal employment opportunity for men and women.”35 
In addition to this gendered origin, leave laws are mostly gendered in application. Thus, 
although men have an equal right to leave under the FMLA and related laws, women use 
32  Albiston, supra note 1, at 134–35. (“The legal theory behind the FMLA is very different from the anti-
discrimination provisions of the ADA and Title VII. The FMLA is based on the same principle as child labor 
laws, the minimum wage, Social Security, the safety and health laws, the pension and welfare benefit laws and 
other labor laws that establish minimum standards for employment.”).
33  Rachel Arnow-Richman, Public Law and Private Process: Toward an Incentivized Organizational Justice 
Model of Equal Employment Quality for Caregivers, 2007 Utah L. Rev. 25, 26–27 (2007) (“With respect to 
gender, women have made significant progress in accessing market work but continue to lag behind men in 
such areas as job advancement, pay, and consistent workforce participation . . . . The standard way work is 
organized—in forty-plus-hour weeks with no time off for childrearing or elder care—excludes many caregivers 
(mostly women, but also some men) from positions for which they are otherwise qualified.”). 
34  Kathryn A. Devinney & Asafu Suzuki, Family and Medical Leave Act, 14 Geo. J. Gender & L. 449, 453 
(2013) (“Congress enacted the FMLA partly in recognition of [the] need for greater gender balance between 
work and family.”); Porter, supra note 12, at 332 (“Much of the impetus [for the FMLA] appears to have been 
the desire to allow women to get pregnant and have babies while working without losing their jobs.”). See 
also Rona Kaufman Kitchen, Missing the Mark: How FMLA’s Bonding Leave Fails Mothers, 31 Hofstra 
Lab. & Emp. L.J. 303, 306 (2014) (“Job-protected family leave was adopted primarily to ease work-family 
conflict experienced by women”); S. Elizabeth Malloy, The Interaction of the ADA, the FMLA, and Workers’ 
Compensation: Why Can’t We Be Friends?, 41 Brandeis L.J. 821, 827 (2002–2003) (“The FMLA reflects 
Congress’s concern that the primary responsibility for family care mainly falls on women and that such family 
responsibilities greatly affect the working opportunities of women more than those of men.”). 
35  29 U.S.C. § 2601.
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these benefits to a much greater degree due to social norms expectations that place this care 
on their shoulders.36
2. Context of Leave Laws: Litigated FMLA Claims 
The FMLA has over twenty years of case law, and these cases further demonstrate 
the hybrid nature of the statute. The FMLA creates two types of legal claims: interference 
claims37 and discrimination claims.38 An interference claim is a denial of benefits claim that 
allows an employee to sue if the employer fails to provide the statutorily guaranteed leave.39 
A discrimination claim is a retaliation claim that allows an employee to sue if the employer 
punishes the employee for exercising his or her FMLA rights.40 Interference claims differ 
from claims under federal anti-discrimination laws such as Title VII which require an 
employee to show that the employer acted with discriminatory intent.41 An FMLA plaintiff 
claiming interference is not required to prove the employer’s intent; the mere denial of 
36  Abt Assocs., Family and Medical Leave in 2012: Technical Report, 60, 64 (2012), http://www.dol.
gov/asp/evaluation/fmla/fmla-2012-technical-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/EG8S-KBEQ]; Devinney & Suzuki, 
supra note 34, at 464 (“Women are much more likely to use FMLA leave to care for others.”); Porter, supra 
note 12, at 341–42 (“[B]y almost all accounts, the FMLA has not led to an appreciable increase in the number 
of men taking leave . . . . Those who take leave for family reasons are much more likely to be women . . . . 
According to some scholars, because women’s role as the primary caregiver is socially constructed, it is not 
possible to change these gender norms through governmental intervention.”); Gely & Chandler, supra note 20, 
at 156 (The vast majority of FMLA plaintiffs are women—eighty-six percent. “Despite the gender neutrality 
of the FMLA, women are most likely to suffer adverse employment outcomes due to work-family conflict and, 
thus, have more frequent opportunities to benefit from the Act’s protections.”).
37  29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1) (“It shall be unlawful for any employer to interfere with, restrain, or deny the 
exercise of or the attempt to exercise, any right provided under this subchapter.”); 29 U.S.C. § 2612 (describing 
the entitlement to leave).
38  29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2) (“It shall be unlawful for any employer to discharge or in any other manner 
discriminate against any individual for opposing any practice made unlawful by this subchapter.”) See also 
King v. Preferred Technical Group, 166 F.3d 887, 891 (7th Cir. 1999) (explaining the FMLA creates two types 
of claims, prescriptive, which is based on an employee’s statutory rights, and proscriptive, which prohibits the 
employer from discriminating or retaliating against an employee for exercising these rights). 
39  29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1); Sandra F. Sperino, Litigating the FMLA in the Shadow of Title VII, 8 Fla. Int’l 
U. L. Rev. 501, 510 (2013).
40  29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2); Sperino, supra note 39, at 510.
41  See, e.g. Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 52 (2003) (“[L]iability in a disparate-treatment case 
depends on whether the protected trait actually motivated the employer’s decision”).
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benefits for which the employee was in fact entitled is sufficient.42 An FMLA discrimination 
claim, however, does resemble anti-discrimination laws such as Title VII, in that it requires 
a plaintiff to prove the employer acted with a particular intent. 43  Specifically, the plaintiff 
must show that the employer took a negative employment action against the employee and 
that the employee’s exercise of FMLA rights was the motivation for the negative action.44  
Thus, in FMLA discrimination claims, the employer’s intent is at issue, but it is a different 
intent. Instead of having to show animus based on a protected characteristic such as gender 
or race, an FMLA discrimination plaintiff must prove the exercise of or attempt to exercise 
FMLA rights was the motivating reason. 45
In FMLA discrimination claims, federal courts use the legal standards developed for 
proving intent in Title VII discrimination cases.46 For example, courts apply the McDonnell 
Douglas three-part burden shifting paradigm developed in Title VII case law to FMLA 
claims.47 Moreover, defendants in FMLA discrimination claims use the same well-
42  Sperino, supra note 39, at 510 (“Once the plaintiff falls within the protected class of the FMLA and 
qualifies for its statutory entitlements, the employer’s intent is not relevant to establishing liability under the 
interference provisions of the statute.”) See also, e.g., King, 166 F.3d at 891.
43  “Confusion often arises as to whether an employee’s FMLA claim is really about interference with his 
substantive rights, not discrimination or retaliation. The difference between the two claims is that the interference 
claim merely requires proof that the employer denied the employee his entitlements under the FMLA, while 
the retaliation claim requires proof of retaliatory intent.” Stallings v. Hussmann Corp., 447 F.3d 1041, 1050–51 
(8th Cir. 2006) (internal quotations omitted). See also Seeger v. Cincinnati Bell Tel. Co., 681 F.3d 274, 282 
(6th Cir. 2012) (“If an employer interferes with the FMLA-created right to medical leave or to reinstatement 
following the leave, a violation has occurred,” regardless of the intent of the employer . . . [t]he central issue 
raised by the retaliation theory, on the other hand, is “whether the employer took the adverse action because 
of a prohibited reason or for a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason.”) (internal quotations omitted); Sperino, 
supra note 39, at 510.
44  See, e.g., Potenza v. City of N.Y., 365 F.3d 165, 168 (2d Cir. 2004).  
45  See, e.g., Ion v. Chevron, 731 F.3d 379, 390 (5th Cir. 2013).
46  Sperino, supra note 39, at 501. Henson v. U.S. Foodservice, Inc., 588 F. App’x 121, 125 (3d Cir. 2014) 
(“Courts generally look at FMLA retaliation claims ‘through the lens of employment discrimination law’ 
because such claims require proof of the employer’s retaliatory intent.”) (quoting Lichtenstein v. Univ. of 
Pittsburgh Med. Ctr., 691 F.3d 294, 302 (3d. Cir. 2012)); Ameen v. Amphenol Printed Circuits, Inc., 777 F.3d 
63, 69 (1st Cir. 2015) (noting FMLA analysis borrows the McDonnell Douglas test from discrimination law to 
manage the “tricky issue” of intent).
47  Sperino, supra note 39, at 509. Sperino critiques the courts’ use of this standard as harmful to the 
purposes of the FMLA. Id. at 509–10 (“[C]ourts have drawn the FMLA into the same framework morass that 
currently exists for Title VII discrimination claims. This phalanx of frameworks distracts courts away from the 
substantive core of the FMLA, and into endless arguments about the substantive and procedural oddities of the 
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developed defenses from anti-discrimination statutes.48 For example, one study found that 
the most common substantive defense to FMLA claims was that an employee’s adverse 
employment outcome was not based on taking FMLA leave, but rather had a legitimate 
basis, a defense commonly found in discrimination suits.49 Overall, the jurisprudence of 
the most significant leave law, the FMLA, demonstrates its hybrid nature. In interference 
claims, the FMLA operates independently. In FMLA discrimination claims, courts use the 
legal standards from anti-discrimination statutes such as Title VII, but to find a different 
type of intent.
3. Context of Leave Laws: Title VII Claims are Particularly Unsuccessful, 
FMLA Claims Fare Better
It is particularly important to understand the degree of association between leave 
laws and anti-discrimination laws because anti-discrimination laws are particularly 
unsuccessful in court. “[E]mployment discrimination cases constitute one of the least 
successful categories at the district court level, in that plaintiffs win a very small percentage 
of their actions and fare worse than in almost any other category of civil case.”50 On appeal, 
employment discrimination plaintiffs who have managed to succeed at trial are far more 
likely to be reversed than employment discrimination defendants or plaintiffs in other civil 
cases.51 At the Supreme Court level, although some recent decisions show the complexity 
frameworks.”). Id. at 501.
48  Gely & Chandler, supra note 20, at 160.
49  Id. at 160.
50  Clermont & Schwab, From Bad to Worse, supra note 2, at 127 (Between 1979 and 2006, the plaintiff 
win rate in federal court for “jobs cases” (15%) was dramatically lower than for “nonjobs cases” (51%).). 
See also Michael Selmi, Why Are Employment Discrimination Cases So Hard to Win?, 61 La. L. Rev. 555, 
559–60 (2001) (describing plaintiffs’ lack of success in discrimination cases, including that “[p]laintiffs in 
employment cases succeeded on only 18.7 percent of the cases tried before a judge, whereas the success rates 
for plaintiffs in judge-tried insurance cases was 43.6 percent and 41.8 percent for personal injury cases.”); 
Joseph A. Seiner, The Trouble with Twombly: A Proposed Pleading Standard for Employment Discrimination 
Cases, 2009 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1011, 1015 (2009) (“[O]ver 80 percent of defendants’ motions for summary 
judgment in employment discrimination cases are either granted or granted-in-part when decided by the district 
court”); Theodore Eisenberg & Elizabeth Hill, Arbitration and Litigation of Employment Claims: An Empirical 
Comparison, 2009 U. Ill. L. Rev. 44, 48 (2009) (analysis of 1,430 employment discrimination cases heard in 
federal courts yielded an employee win rate of 36.4%).
51  Clermont & Schwab, From Bad to Worse, supra note 2, at 111–12. “The vulnerability on appeal of 
jobs plaintiffs’ relatively few trial victories is more startling in light of the nature of these cases and the 
applicable standard of review. The bulk of employment discrimination cases turn on intent, and not on disparate 
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of employment jurisprudence,52 many decisions have distinctly limited the impact of pro-
employee legislation.53 Indeed, on more than one occasion, the Supreme Court has so 
severely limited employee rights law that Congress amended the statutes to overturn the 
Court.54 
The available data shows that FMLA claims, our best example of leave laws available, 
are indeed more successful than anti-discrimination claims.55 
FMLA claimants win pretrial adjudications at roughly 4 times the rate 
of discrimination litigants, and prevail at trial in roughly 60% of cases, 
as compared to the roughly 30–35% trial victory rates of discrimination 
litigants. Indeed, the overall “win” rate for FMLA litigants is close 
to double the win rates for discrimination claimants (win rates that are 
strikingly similar (and low) across all of the various discrimination 
statutes, including Title VII, the ADA, § 1981 and the ADEA).56
Logic suggests that the hybrid nature of leave laws, specifically their status as at 
least partially benefit based laws, could explain the different outcomes. Further evidence, 
however, is necessary to understand what might be motivating the different judicial results 
for the FMLA, and by extension other leave laws. This understanding is important for the 
study of judicial decision-making in employment law and for activists seeking to construct 
effective workers’ rights laws that address women’s status and needs.
impact. The subtle question of the defendant’s intent is likely to be the key issue in a non-frivolous employment 
discrimination case that reaches trial, putting the credibility of witnesses into play. When the plaintiff has 
convinced the fact finder of the defendant’s wrongful intent, that finding should be largely immune from 
appellate reversal, just as defendants’ trial victories are. Reversal of plaintiffs’ trial victories in employment 
discrimination cases should be unusually uncommon. Yet we find the opposite.” Id. at 112.
52  Even the conservative Supreme Court justices will, on occasion, issue pro-employee Title VII decisions. 
See, e.g., Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338 (2015) (conservative Justices Roberts and Alito 
supported the pro-employee, liberal outcome).
53  Kate Webber, It Is Political: Using the Models of Judicial Decision-Making to Explain the Ideological 
History of Title VII, 50 St. John’s U. L. Rev. 1, 6–8 (2015) [hereinafter Webber, Title VII].
54  Id. at 8–10.
55  Eyer, supra note 3, at 1352 (citing Clermont & Schwab, How Plaintiffs Fare, supra note 3).
56  Id.
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II. Judicial Decision-Making on Leave Laws
In an idealized scenario, expanded leave is implemented without judicial intervention 
because a leave law provides for an employee benefit as opposed to a civil right. As noted 
above, while an anti-discrimination law gives a wrongfully terminated employee the right 
to sue for damages, expanded leave laws mandate an employee benefit within the working 
relationship. Of course, in reality, judicial intervention is sometimes required to ensure 
employees are indeed receiving their benefits, to punish employers who fail to comply, 
and to deter others from doing so.57 The judicial role of enforcement may be particularly 
important for leave rights. Scholars of leave routinely find that even when leave benefits 
are available, employees—particularly male employees—are afraid to or unwilling to take 
them.58 These workers are constrained by a workplace culture that devalues leave and 
perceives those who do take it as deviating from workplace norms.59 The natural implication 
is that those who take leave may indeed face unlawful retaliation for which a civil suit is 
the necessary remedy. The data suggests that these plaintiffs have and may continue to 
have better results than anti-discrimination plaintiffs. Various theories of judicial decision-
making, political, psychological and institutional, offer potential explanations for this 
difference. 
A. Political Science Theory: Leave Laws are More Successful Because They 
Are Less Controversial
1. Models of Judicial Decision-Making 
Political science scholars have developed theories on judicial decision-making based 
on empirical studies of a large body of decisions.60 These scholars developed methods of 
57  Gely & Chandler, supra note 20, at 145 (“[T]o a large measure, the ultimate effect of a statute depends 
on litigation outcomes.”).
58  Bartel, et al., supra note 12, at 5; Jane Waldfogel, Bureau of Labor Statistics: Monthly Labor 
Report, Family and Medical Leave: Evidence from the 2000 Surveys, 18 (2001).
59  Cases demonstrate that this is occurring. See Joan C. Williams & Allison Tait, “Mancession” or 
“Momcession”?: Good Providers, a Bad Economy, and Gender Discrimination, 86 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 857, 
865 (2011) (“Claims show that working men who openly demonstrate that they have caregiving responsibilities 
are viewed as less dependable, less ambitious and driven, and often engaged in gender-inappropriate work.”).
60  Webber, Title VII, supra note 53, at 17. See, e.g., Richard L. Pacelle, Jr., Brett W. Curry & Bryan 
W. Marshall, Decision Making by the Modern Supreme Court 28–49 (2011). See also generally, Lee 
Epstein & Jack Knight, The Choices Justices Make (1998); Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold J. Spaeth, The 
Attitudinal Model Revisited (2002). 
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measuring judicial ideology and used statistical analysis to test whether ideology influences 
decisions.61 The consensus among these studies is that ideology does play a meaningful 
role in decisions, particularly Supreme Court decisions.62 A number of studies also find 
ideology to play a role in federal circuit courts.63
Although there is consensus that ideology plays a role in judicial decision-making, 
political science scholars differ on whether ideological voting is constrained by other 
factors, such as the weight of precedent or the potential for congressional amendments of 
the law at issue.64 The attitudinal model of judicial decision-making holds that judges make 
decisions based on ideology and that only this factor has been empirically demonstrated 
with any certainty.65 The strategic model asserts that although ideology influences judges, 
it is not the only influence; judges’ decisions also reflect their concern that a case outcome 
might inspire a punitive response by the legislative or executive branches. For example, 
strategic modelists argue that the threat of legislative override or impeachment or reducing 
funding can temper the judicial desire for ideologically consistent case outcomes and 
cause a judge to vote contrary to ideology.66 Other integrated models find that judges are 
61  Webber, Title VII, supra note 53, at 17. See, e.g., Segal & Spaeth, supra note 60, at 312–26; Pacelle, et 
al., supra note 60, at 44, 71.
62  Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard Murphy, Politicized Judicial Review in Administrative Law: Three 
Improbable Responses, 19 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 319, 321 (2012); Webber, Title VII, supra note 53, at 17. See 
also Mario Bergara et al., Modeling Supreme Court Strategic Decision Making: The Congressional Constraint, 
28 Legis. Stud. Q. 247, 267 (2003) (strategic model study concluding that ideology influences the Court in 
addition to strategic concerns); Pacelle et al., supra note 60, at 53 (noting conclusion that Court decisions 
reflect “ideological predilections” among other factors); Segal & Spaeth, supra note 60, at 312–26 (attitudinal 
model conclusion that ideology affects Supreme Court decisions).
63  See, e.g., Frank Cross, Decision Making in the U.S. Court of Appeals 38 (2007). However, “a large 
majority of the published appellate court cases are unanimous, maybe up to 85 percent.” Shapiro & Murphy, 
supra note 62, at 329, 330 (the effect of ideology on Circuit Court decisions is small).
64  See Webber, Title VII, supra note 53, at 18; Kate Webber, Correcting the Supreme Court–Will It Listen? 
Using the Models of Judicial Decision-Making to Predict the Future of the ADA Amendments Act, 23 S. Cal. 
Interdisc. L.J. 305, 308–15 (2014) [hereinafter Webber, ADA].
65  Webber, Title VII, supra note 53, at 18. See also Lee Epstein, William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, 
The Behavior of Federal Judges 69 (2013); Pacelle, et al., supra note 60, at 34–36; Segal & Spaeth, supra 
note 60, at 86.
66  Michael A. Bailey & Forrest Maltzman, The Constrained Court: Law, Politics, and the Decisions 
Justices Make 97–101 (2011) (describing strategic model); Pacelle, et al., supra note 60, at 39–45 (same); 
Webber, Title VII, supra note 53, at 18.
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ideological in part, but also modify their decisions based on strategic concerns and a respect 
for legal principles such as precedent.67  
The political science models of judicial decision-making offer a potentially useful 
heuristic for understanding current and future judicial interpretation of leave laws. 
Preliminarily, the ideology of leave laws is fairly logical—traditional conservative 
ideology resists workplace regulations such as leave laws while liberal ideology supports 
greater legal protection for workers.68 Consequently, under the attitudinal model, plaintiffs’ 
success in enforcing leave laws would depend on whether the majority of the judges/
justices deciding the case are conservative or liberal.69 Under the strategic model, this 
ideological determinant plays a role but will be tempered by the ideology of Congress and 
the executive branch.70 Under the strategic model, at the time of a decision on leave laws, a 
judge will consider potential negative responses whether by an appellate court, legislative 
override, or executive punishment such as budget allocation. As a result, a judge’s vote on 
a leave law may not be based solely on ideology, but rather would be mitigated in order to 
avoid these negative responses. Specifically, the judge’s decision would reflect the position 
that is closest to the judge’s desired ideological outcome as possible, but not so strident as 
67  Integrated models find a role for the force of the law itself, but that it is just one of multiple factors. 
Webber, ADA, supra note 64, at 313–14. Significantly, political science theorists reject the naïve legal model 
that judges base decisions only on the law, and critique the legal academy for its embrace and teaching of this 
notion. Id. at 309–10. Some political science theorists do expand the analysis of judicial decision-making 
beyond the three models described here. See, e.g., Epstein et al., supra note 65. 
68  Webber, Title VII, supra note 53, at 4–5; see, e.g., Christopher Smith, Polarized Circuits: Party Affiliation 
of Appointing Presidents, Ideology, and Circuit Court Voting in Race and Gender Civil Rights Cases, 22 
Hastings Women’s L. J. 157, 160, 165 (2011) (a vote in favor of a race or gender civil rights claim is a vote 
in a liberal direction) (citing Cass R. Sunstein et al., Are Judges Political? An Empirical Analysis of 
the Federal Judiciary 19 (2006) (voting in favor of a discrimination plaintiff is liberal)). See also Harold J. 
Spaeth, The Supreme Court Database: Decision Direction, Wash. U. L., http://scdb.wustl.edu/documentation.
php?var=decisionDirection [https://perma.cc/M5PV-L2WH] (last visited Feb. 26, 2014) (describing how this 
database of Supreme Court decisions coded “pro civil liberties or civil rights claimants . . . anti-employer” 
outcomes as liberal and the reverse outcomes as conservative). 
69  “[A]lmost twice as many sitting judges were appointed by Republican presidents than by Democratic 
presidents [which] disadvantages litigants that press liberal positions before the courts, such as environmental 
groups or civil rights groups.” Shapiro & Murphy, supra note 62, at 322.
70  Or the ideology of appellate judges. Much of the political science literature on decision-making is based 
upon studies of the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Pacelle, et al., supra note 60. Some of the studies of the lower 
courts find that indeed appellate review is a mitigating force against the pursuit of ideological goals. See, e.g., 
Epstein et al., supra note 65.
Columbia Journal of Gender and Law160 32.1
to cause a reversal, override, or other similar reprisal.71 Finally, under the integrated model, 
both of these forces are at play, but judges interpreting leave laws may also be motivated 
by legal factors that may apply, such as precedent, and at least theoretically, the language 
of the statute itself.72  
2. Using the Models to Contrast Leave Laws and Anti-Discrimination 
Laws
Although each model presents different views of the factors influencing decision-
making, the one consistent message from these political theories is that ideology plays a 
role in judicial interpretation of leave laws. It is this aspect of political theory that offers a 
potential basis for understanding why leave laws have been and may continue to be more 
successful than anti-discrimination laws. This comparison is complicated by the FMLA’s 
dual nature, with both benefit based and intent-based claims.73 It is the intent-based claims 
that have the most direct analogy to anti-discrimination laws; yet available data generally 
groups all FMLA claims together.74 Nonetheless, the comparison of anti-discrimination laws 
and the FMLA using political science studies does reveal useful information, particularly 
in light of the unique data on the judicial response to anti-discrimination laws. 
A number of scholars, in a variety of contexts, have found that anti-discrimination 
laws trigger a particularly strong ideological response from the judiciary.75 For example, 
Jeb Barnes describes how the Supreme Court justices continued to follow their own 
conservative ideological preferences in Title VII cases even after Congress amended the 
71  Bailey & Maltzman, supra note 66, at 97–101; Webber, Title VII, supra note 53, at 18.
72  Webber, Title VII, supra note 53, at 18 n.119. See Bailey & Maltzman, supra note 66; Pacelle, et al., 
supra note 60. Studies finding legal factors to play a role are typically testing only the effect of precedential 
cases. The empirical evidence does not generally test for the influence of statutory language. Webber, ADA, 
supra note 64, at 337–38.
73  See Part I.B.1 supra.
74  See, e.g., Clermont & Schwab, How Plaintiffs Fare, supra note 3, at 445.
75  Shapiro & Murphy, supra note 62, at 337–38 (during the time period 1977–1987, “Democratic judges 
were 3.19 times more likely to make a liberal decision in race discrimination cases than were their Republican 
counterparts.”) (citing C.K. Rowland & Robert A. Carp, Politics and Judgments in Federal District 
Courts 152–74 (1996)). See also Webber, Title VII, supra note 53, at 20–21, 28, 32. Relatedly, a number of 
scholars have found that ideological voting is most prevalent on salient issues, and that lack of salience can 
explain instances when judges appear to be voting contrary to ideological leanings. Webber, Title VII, supra 
note 53, at 23 (citing Unah & Hancock, at *16-18; Pacelle, et al., supra note 60, at 202). 
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law in 1991 specifically to override a series of more conservative Court decisions.76 Frank 
B. Cross and Blake Nelson similarly describe a conservative Supreme Court’s ideological 
voting in Title VII cases, ignoring Congress’ clear message that it intended a broader 
interpretation of the statute.77 A study by G. Mitu Gulati and Stephen Choi found that “the 
tendency to cite on the basis of ideology varies by subject matter,”78 and that for certain 
“hot button issues” including race, sex, and age discrimination, judges are even more likely 
to cite judges of the same political party and to not cite to opposite party judges.79 This 
empirical evidence of particularly strong judicial bias in employment discrimination cases 
is supported by anecdotal evidence as well.80 
76  Webber, Title VII, supra note 53, at 32 (citing Jeb Barnes, Overruled?: Legislative Overrides, 
Pluralism, and Contemporary Court-Congress Relations 13–15 (2004) (noting for example that following 
the CRA, the Supreme Court still felt free to create its own employer-friendly standard for punitive damages, 
contrary to the language of the statute)). Jeb Barnes goes on to explain how judges appear to be particularly 
resistant to congressional restraint in cases involving “the statutory rights of discrete, insular minorities, such 
as African Americans or immigrants.” Barnes, supra at 171.
77  Webber, Title VII, supra note 53, at 32 (citing Frank B. Cross & Blake J. Nelson, Strategic Institutional 
Effects on Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 95 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1437, 1456–58 (2001)). See also Frank Cross, 
Decision Making in the U.S. Court of Appeals 112 (2007)
78  Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Bias in Judicial Citations: A Window into the Behavior of Judges?, 
37 J. Legal Stud. 87, 91 (2008). See also Epstein et al., supra note 65, at 219 (noting that in district court 
decisions “employment and other discrimination cases tend to be decided more conservatively”); Cass R. 
Sunstein et al., Ideological Voting on Federal Courts of Appeals: A Preliminary Investigation, 90 Va. L. Rev. 
301 (2004) (finding ideological effects in judicial voting patterns are stronger for certain categories of cases, 
including politically controversial areas). 
79  Choi & Gulati, supra note 78, at 91. (“These results support the view that bias is likely the product of 
the specific ideologies of the authoring judges.”). Other distinct voting patterns emerge in anti-discrimination 
cases. For example, Sean Farhang & Gregory Wawro found that women judges “were quite significantly 
more liberal than men in employment discrimination cases,” despite lack of gender effect in other areas. Sean 
Farhang & Gregory Wawro, Institutional Dynamics on the U.S. Court of Appeals: Minority Representation 
Under Panel Decision Making, 20 J.L. Econ. & Org. 299, 303 (2004).
80  “[T]he federal judiciary has become increasingly unfriendly towards employment discrimination cases 
going to trial. Those of us in the legal profession not living under a large rock would be hard pressed not to have 
noticed this.” Mark W. Bennett, Essay: From the “No Spittin’, No Cussin’ and No Summary Judgment” Days 
of Employment Discrimination Litigation to the “Defendant’s Summary Judgment Affirmed Without Comment” 
Days: One Judge’s Four-Decade Perspective, 57 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 685, 697 (2013). “Judge Milton Shadur, 
of the Northern District of Illinois, wrote, ‘When the close-of-discovery bell rings, the Rule 56 dog salivates. 
That almost instinctive response seems to be particularly marked in employment discrimination cases, with 
active encouragement of most courts of appeals . . . ’” Id. at 692. “Judge Jack Weinstein, of the Eastern District 
of New York, also recognized ‘[t]he dangers of robust use of summary judgment to clear trial dockets,” finding 
its use to be “particularly acute in current sex discrimination cases.’” Id. at 693. See also Selmi, supra note 50, 
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As noted above, leave laws have a gendered aspect and history, as well as a connection 
to the protected status of disabled. These laws, however, also have a neutral application 
and, at least some aspects, such as leave for one’s own medical condition, do not reflect 
the gendered issue of women’s greater caretaking or protected class. As a result, leave laws 
such as the FMLA may trigger ideological responses—pro-employee support from liberal 
judges and anti-regulation opposition from conservative judges—but may not trigger the 
uniquely strong ideological responses of the anti-discrimination laws such as Title VII. 
Leave laws are pro-employee; however, they are not protected class-based.81 This crucial 
distinction possibly removes the FMLA from the “hot button,” highly ideological realm 
of anti-discrimination statutes, and thus may not trigger the strongest ideological response 
from judges.
3. Problems with the Ideology Analysis and Evidence
The evidence that the FMLA is less controversial, however, is limited and indirect. 
While some political science studies analyze judicial decision-making on particular issues, 
the literature does not generally offer the degree of detail necessary to fully distinguish 
between different types of employment laws.82 Scholars have critiqued this lack of context.83 
The stronger proof would be specific empirical data comparing the degree of ideological 
voting in FMLA cases in contrast to the degree of ideological voting in Title VII cases. 
The ideology argument presents further challenges. FMLA claims do fare significantly 
better than Title VII claims. It is difficult, however, to demonstrate that this occurs because 
leave laws trigger a lower ideological response than anti-discrimination law. For example, 
the difference in case outcomes may simply be due to the FMLA’s substantive differences 
from anti-discrimination laws. A fair portion of political science models accept that law 
constrains the ideological voting of judges, particularly at the lower court level.84 According 
at 556–57 (2001) (describing how judicial bias contributes to the unusual difficulty of proving employment 
discrimination claims). 
81  Albiston, supra note 1, at 134–35. In the case of the FMLA, Congress specifically considered and 
intended for the law to avoid protected class-based rights. Id. at 135.
82  If the premise is that leave laws are more successful because they are less ideological, FMLA cases should 
demonstrate more examples of judges voting contrary to their expected position based on ideology than cases 
involving Title VII.
83  Shapiro & Murphy, supra note 62, at 329 (noting the lack of evidence as to how significant the influence 
of ideology is on case outcomes). 
84  See, e.g., Epstein et al., supra note 65, at 10–11, 253.
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to this version of political science thought, ideology is not the only factor in case outcomes, 
and it is therefore possible that different outcomes can be explained by different legal 
provisions rather than difference in ideological controversy. Significant legal differences do 
exist between the FMLA and Title VII. At least some types of FMLA violations are easier to 
prove than discrimination claims. For example, in claiming that an employer denied FMLA 
benefits, the employee will not have to show the employer had any ill intent.85 Instead, the 
employee need only show entitlement and denial.86 In anti-discrimination statutes such as 
Title VII, however, the plaintiff must prove the employer’s discriminatory intent, a much 
greater evidentiary challenge.87
At the same time, there is a category of FMLA cases that are intent based. Employees 
who took FMLA leave and subsequently experience negative treatment by the employer 
may have a claim for FMLA retaliation.88 This claim requires the employee to prove 
intent and for this analysis courts have borrowed the methods of anti-discrimination law.89 
Specifically, courts have applied the Title VII McDonnell Douglas burden shifting analysis 
that allows an employee to prove intent by circumstantial evidence.90 Thus, to the extent 
the greater success of FMLA claims includes greater success on intent-based claims, this 
would suggests the difference in outcomes is not ease of proof, but rather some other factor 
such as a different degree of ideological controversy.
Some data suggests that in fact, FMLA intent claims, with the same evidentiary challenge 
of proving intent, still experience greater success than Title VII claims. Professors Gely and 
Chandler examined a body of FMLA cases, including a sub-category of cases where intent 
was clearly at issue, i.e. cases where the employee claimed she/he suffered an adverse 
employment event due to exercising FMLA rights and the employer claimed the event 
was due to legitimate workplace reasons.91 Gely and Chandler found that in those cases, 
employers won the vast majority of the time, with plaintiffs succeeding just thirty-five 
85  Sperino, supra note 39, at 510.
86  Id.
87  Id. at 509.
88  Id. at 510.
89  Id.
90  See, e.g., Rachel Arnow-Richman, Accommodation Subverted: The Future of Work/Family Initiatives in 
a “Me, Inc.” World, 12 Tex. J. Women & L. 345, 369–73 (2003).
91  Gely & Chandler, supra note 20, at 165–66.
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percent of the time.92 This seemingly low number however, still compares favorably with 
the dismal success rate of discrimination cases overall. For example, in 2004 Clermont and 
Schwab measured the discrimination success rate at approximately seventeen percent.93 
Thus, even when claims under both statutes raise the difficult issue of intent, the FMLA 
claims appear to fare better than Title VII claims. This raises at least some evidence that 
the difference in FMLA and Title VII outcomes is not due solely to substantive differences 
in the laws.
Even if evidence can refute law as the causal difference between FMLA and Title VII 
outcomes, affirmative proof of ideology as the causal factor remains elusive. Case law at 
the Supreme Court level does not add much clarity to the issue. In fact, the Supreme Court 
has only decided three FMLA cases. With a few exceptions, the overall voting patterns of 
all three cases match ideology with conservative justices voting in favor of the employer’s 
position and liberal justices voting in favor of the employee’s position. The significance 
of these votes is limited, however, given the dearth of cases. Moreover, all three cases 
involved other substantive issues which could have driven the votes: two of them involved 
issues of federalism and 11th Amendment immunity and one concerned the regulatory 
power of the Department of Labor.94
In Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Maryland,95 the Supreme Court issued a conservative96 
92  Id.
93  Clermont & Schwab, How Plaintiffs Fare, supra note 3, at 457. The 2004 data is the most contemporaneous 
to the Gely article. Gely & Chandler supra note 20. More recent data places the Title VII win rate at approximately 
ten percent. Clermont & Schwab, From Bad to Worse, supra note 2, at 117. This is only a rough comparison. 
The two success percentages are not directly comparable as the two studies look at different time periods and 
a different pool of cases. In addition the overall win rates from Clermont/Schwab incorporate Title VII, ADA, 
ADEA and FMLA claims. That said, when the Clermont/Schwab data separates out FMLA claims from other 
discrimination claims, in both 2004 and 2009, they find FMLA claims are still nearly twice as successful as 
Title VII claims. Clermont & Schwab, How Plaintiffs Fare, supra note 3, at 445; Clermont & Schwab, From 
Bad to Worse, supra note 2, at 117. Although the Clermont/Schwab data does not distinguish between FMLA 
intent and non-intent claims, it would not seem likely that such a large success differential would entirely arise 
from the non-intent claims. 
94  Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Md., 132 S. Ct. 1327 (2012); Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 
U.S. 721, 725 (2003); Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 535 U.S. 81 (2002). 
95  Coleman, 132 S. Ct. 1327. 
96  See, e.g., Smith, supra note 68, at 165 (a vote in favor of a race or gender civil rights claim is a vote in a 
liberal direction) (citing Sunstein et al., supra note 68 (voting in favor of a discrimination plaintiff is liberal)). 
See also Lee Epstein & William M. Landes, Was There Ever Such a Thing as Judicial Self-Restraint? 100 
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decision limiting the reach of the FMLA. In Coleman, the Court voted 5-4 along ideological 
lines.97 In Ragsale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., the Supreme Court issued a conservative 
decision on the FMLA.98 The six-justice majority consisted of conservative and swing votes 
with three liberal justices dissenting.99 Although the presence of swing justices on both 
sides and Justice Stevens’s conservative vote does not fit a standard ideological pattern, the 
overall predominance of conservatives in the majority and liberals in the minority does. 
Conservative Chief Justice Rehnquist authored the liberal opinion in Nevada Dep’t. of 
Calif. L. Rev. 557, 565 (2012) (using database to determine the ideological direction of the Court’s decisions); 
Spaeth, supra note 68.
97  Conservative Justices Roberts, Alito, Thomas, and Scalia joined swing Justice Kennedy in finding that 
the “self-care” provision of the FMLA did not apply to state government employees. See Barbara A. Perry, The 
“Bush Twins”? Roberts, Alito, and the Conservative Agenda, 92 Judicature 302 (2009) (describing Roberts 
and Alito as conservative); Erwin Chemerinsky, The Roberts Court and Criminal Procedure at Age Five, 43 
Tex. Tech L. Rev. 13, 15 (2010) (identifying the conservative bloc of Roberts, Scalia, Thomas, and Alito); 
Richard G. Wilkins et al., Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 2006 Term, 36 Hastings Const. L.Q. 51, 57 (2008) 
(identifying conservative voting patterns of Scalia, Thomas, Roberts, and Alito). Coleman, 132 S. Ct. at 1339. 
See Injustice 5, Justice 4, N.Y. Times, May 31, 2007 (describing Kennedy as a swing vote); Wilkins et al., supra 
at 37 (same). Coleman, 132 S. Ct. at 1332. The self-care provision allows employees to take time off under 
the FMLA for their serious medical condition. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D). Liberal Justices Ginsberg, Breyer, 
Sotomayor, and Kagan dissented. See Charles D. Kelso & R. Randall Kelso, The Constitutional Jurisprudence 
of Justice Kennedy on Speech, 49 San Diego L. Rev. 693, 694 (2012) (identifying the current liberal bloc as 
Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan); Chemerinsky, supra note 97, at 15 (identifying Justices 
Ginsburg and Breyer as part of the liberal bloc). 
98  Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 535 U.S. 81 (2002) (overturning a Department of Labor regulation 
that had required employers to specifically designate leave as FMLA leave in order for an employee’s time off 
to count against the twelve week FMLA entitlement).
99  Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas, swing Justice Kennedy, and liberal Justice Stevens. Id. at 83. 
See James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Liberal Justices’ Reliance on Legislative History: Principle, Strategy, 
and the Scalia Effect, 29 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 117, 120 (2008) (describing Stevens as a liberal justice); 
Michael C. Dorf, Does Federal Executive Branch Experience Explain Why Some Republican Supreme Court 
Justices “Evolve” and Others Don’t?, 1 Harv. L. & Pol’y Rev. 457, 462 (2007) (describing conventional 
wisdom, confirmed by analysis of voting patterns, that Justice Burger was a conservative and Rehnquist even 
more so); Lori A. Ringhand, Judicial Activism: An Empirical Examination of Voting Behavior on the Rehnquist 
Natural Court, 24 Const. Comment. 43, 48 (2007) (describing Rehnquist’s conservative voting patterns). 
Swing Justice O’Connor was joined in her dissent by liberal Justices Ginsburg, Souter, and Breyer. Ragsdale, 
535 U.S. at 96. Brudney & Corey, supra note 99, at 120 (describing Souter as a liberal justice). See Robert H. 
Smith, Uncoupling the “Centrist Bloc”—an Empirical Analysis of the Thesis of A Dominant, Moderate Bloc on 
the United States Supreme Court, 62 Tenn. L. Rev. 1, 3 (1994) (noting the common description of O’Connor as 
a centrist); Eric J. Segall, Justice O’Connor and the Rule of Law, 17 U. Fla. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 107, 134 (2006) 
(“For most of her time on the bench, Justice O’Connor served as the crucial swing vote.”).
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Human Resources v. Hibbs,100 a surprising development much discussed among scholars of 
the Court.101 With the notable exception of the Chief Justice, the decision in this case falls 
along predicted ideological lines.102 
Overall, the few Supreme Court cases available cannot by themselves establish that 
ideological voting is curbed in leave or family benefit law versus protected class cases.
It is possible that a larger pool of cases from lower federal courts could demonstrate 
whether ideological voting occurs in FMLA cases and to what degree. Data specifically 
analyzing this question, however, is unavailable.103 The most suggestive data is a difference 
in success rates depending upon the type of FMLA claim. The Gely/Chandler study found 
that FMLA claims arising from employees taking leave for pregnancy complications 
succeeded only 22.9% of the time while FMLA claims for leave related to the birth or 
adoption of a child succeeded in 41.9% of cases.104 Thus the claim most closely associated 
to the protected class of gender (women), is dramatically less successful than the more 
neutral benefit of time off to care for a new child in the household, which either men or 
women may take. It is the protected class status that political scientists and other scholars 
have found to trigger the most ideological response.105
4. Conclusions on the Explanatory Utility of Ideology
As detailed above, it would be useful to try to understand the difference in judicial 
response to leave laws in contrast to the highly unsuccessful anti-discrimination laws. 
One possible explanation is that leave laws such as the FMLA do not trigger as strong an 
100  538 U.S. 721, 725 (2003) (holding that Congress properly abrogated 11th Amendment immunity and 
that state government employees were entitled to the protections of the FMLA’s family care provisions). Family 
care refers to the portion of the FMLA that allows qualified employees to take up to twelve weeks unpaid, job-
protected leave for the birth or adoption of a child or to care for a close family member suffering from a serious 
medical condition. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(C). 
101  538 U.S. 721 at 724.
102  Joining the Chief Justice were liberal Justices Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer, with liberal Justice Stevens 
joining in the outcome with a concurring opinion. Id. at 740. Conservative Justices Scalia and Thomas, as well 
as swing Justice Kennedy dissented. 
103  Moreover, there is evidence that lower courts are not as ideological in their voting patterns in any event. 
See Epstein et al., supra note 65, at 10–11, 253. 
104  Gely & Chandler, supra note 20, at 165–66.
105  See supra note 75. 
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ideological response as anti-discrimination laws. There is evidence that anti-discrimination 
statutes do trigger a uniquely strong ideological response, but incomplete (and at best 
indirect) evidence suggesting the FMLA is less ideological. As a result, it is useful to expand 
beyond political science theory to further understand judicial interpretation of leave laws, 
and in doing so address some of the other available theories of judicial decision-making. 
B. Psychology Theory: Leave Laws Avoid Unconscious Cultural Resistance
An alternative theory of judicial decision-making is cultural cognition. Cultural 
cognition theory rejects the premise that judicial decision-making is consciously ideological 
and instead posits that decisions reflect the cultural and cognitive forces that subconsciously 
affect judges as they affect anyone.106 These cultural cognition models offer a different 
basis for understanding why plaintiffs suing under existing leave laws fare better than anti-
discrimination plaintiffs. Significantly, although this is a different theoretical framework, 
the explanation remains the same: leave laws are and will be more successful than anti-
discrimination laws because they are more “neutral” and avoid some of the controversies 
of laws based on protected class status.
1. Cultural Cognition
Cultural cognition is “the ubiquitous tendency of people to form perceptions, and to 
process factual information generally, in a manner congenial to their values and desires.”107 
This describes an unconscious psychological phenomenon where individuals selectively 
disregard information that contradicts their underlying values or outlook and overvalue 
information that is consistent.108 Under this perspective, judges are not “self-consciously 
106  See, e.g., Paul M. Secunda, Cultural Cognition at Work, 38 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 107, 108–09 (2010) 
[hereinafter Secunda, Cognition at Work] (“[C]ontrary to many commentators who have suggested that judging 
is generally an ideologically driven enterprise, Dan Kahan, Donald Braman, and other members of Yale Law 
School’s Cultural Cognition Project have persuasively argued that such popular theories do not sufficiently 
explain the mechanism by which values influence judges.”); Shapiro & Murphy, supra note 62, at 337 (noting 
for example two scholars of the cognitive model who offered it as an alternative to the attitudinal model in their 
study of the federal district courts).
107  Paul M. Secunda, Cognitive Illiberalism and Institutional Debiasing Strategies, 49 San Diego L. Rev. 
373, 374 (2012) [hereinafter Secunda, Cognitive Illiberalism]. See also, Shapiro & Murphy, supra note 62, at 
337; Secunda, Cognition at Work, supra note 106, at 112 (“Cultural cognition is a heuristic that comes to the 
legal academy from research conducted in the disciplines of anthropology and social psychology”).
108  Secunda, Cognitive Illiberalism, supra note 107, at 380–81; Shapiro & Murphy, supra note 62, at 337 
(“[A]s a matter of individual psychology, ‘it is much easier to believe that behavior one finds noble is also 
socially beneficial and behavior one finds base is dangerous rather than vice versa’”) (quoting Dan M. Kahan, 
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partisans” and they do “seek to arrive at the right decision without being ideologically 
committed to any prior legal or political view.”109 Instead, biased decision-making is the 
result of judges unconsciously bringing their own cultural perspective to bear.110  
The biased decision-making resulting from culturally motivated cognition, is termed 
“cognitive illiberalism.”111 Thus, cognitive illiberalism makes judges vulnerable to 
betraying their commitment to neutrality by unconsciously applying their particular biases 
in interpreting a case.112 Cognitive illiberalism corrupts the legal decision-making process 
in a particularly insidious manner because individuals generally cannot identify when their 
unconscious cultural assumptions are slanting their interpretation of events.113 
Professor Paul Secunda has identified cognitive illiberalism in various labor and 
employment contexts.114 He asserts that the cultural cognition paradigm “provides a more 
robust explanation of how judicial values impact judicial decisions,” than ideology based 
models of decision-making.115 As he explains, labor and employment decisions are the 
“Ideology in” or “Cultural Cognition of” Judging: What Difference Does it Make?, 92 Marq. L. Rev. 413, 
413 (2009)).
109  Secunda, Cognitive Illiberalism, supra note 107, at 379; Shapiro & Murphy, supra note 62, at 337.
110  Secunda, Cognitive Illiberalism, supra note 107, at 380; Shapiro & Murphy, supra note 62, at 337 
(describing the “cognition model” of judicial decision-making which describes judges as intending to let the 
law be their guide but ultimately voting in an ideological manner due to subconscious influence of cultural 
cognition). “Although some judges can rightly be accused of engaging in an outright ideologically motivated 
form of judicial bias, this Article maintains that the majority of judges are sincerely not engaged in this kind 
of ideologically based decisionmaking. Rather, a better and perhaps more helpful understanding is that . . . 
beliefs feed on themselves within cultural groups, whose members stubbornly dismiss as unworthy insights 
originating outside the group.” Secunda, Cognitive Illiberalism, supra note 107, at 381.
111  Secunda, Cognitive Illiberalism, supra note 107, at 380.
112  Id. at 383.
113  Id. at 383–84; Ann C. McGinley, Cognitive Illiberalism, Summary Judgment, and Title VII: An 
Examination of Ricci v. Destefano, 57 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 865, 874 (2013).
114  See, e.g., Secunda, Cognition at Work, supra note 106 (applying cultural cognition theory to a union 
labor case and to an equal protection public employment case); Paul M. Secunda, Cultural Cognition Insights 
into Judicial Decisionmaking in Employee Benefits Cases, 3 Am. U. Lab. & Emp. L.F. 1 (2013) (applying 
cultural cognition theory to employee benefits cases). See also McGinley, supra note 113, at 869–70 (finding 
cultural cognition explained the Supreme Court’s decision to grant summary judgment to plaintiffs in Ricci v. 
DeStefano).
115  Secunda, Cognition at Work, supra note 106, at 109 (“[H]owever one defines ‘ideology,’ the common 
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type of case where cultural cognition is likely to occur because they frequently involve 
disagreements over legally consequential facts.116 “In the labor and employment context 
[cognitive illiberalism] transforms everyday legal debates over how to provide justice and 
fairness in the workplace into instances of political and legal status competition between 
management and labor interests.”117 Naturally, this poses a threat to the ideal of fair 
decision-making in these cases.118
Other scholars have more specifically identified the ways that cultural biases and 
unconscious psychological presumptions affect decisions in employment discrimination 
cases.119 For example, Professor Katie Eyer demonstrates how preconceptions and other 
cognitive factors can cause decision-makers to be unconsciously less sympathetic to 
discrimination claims.120 As she explains, studies show that many Americans hold the belief 
that illegal or illicit conduct is rare, which decreases the willingness of decision-makers to 
attribute an employment action to discrimination.121 Similarly, the strongly held American 
belief in meritocracy122 makes decision-makers resistant to discrimination claims—to 
believe discrimination has occurred means meritocracy failed.123 Overall, “psychology 
scholars have documented that claims of discrimination trigger uniquely hostile responses 
from observers.”124 
ideological explanations for judges’ behavior in workplace cases are inadequate.”).
116  Secunda, Cognitive Illiberalism, supra note 107, at 379–80.
117  Id. at 384.
118  Id. at 380.
119  See, e.g., McGinley, supra note 113.
120  Eyer, supra note 3, at 1346–48.
121  Id. at 1347.
122  “It is well-established that the overwhelming majority of Americans—of all groups and races—subscribe 
to some extent to meritocracy beliefs. Indeed, meritocracy beliefs are so widespread in the United States that 
they are frequently referred to as the dominant or national American ideology. Meritocracy beliefs can take a 
variety of forms, but typically center around a cluster of related beliefs that: (1) hard work gets you ahead in 
life; (2) advancement is possible for all individuals in American society; and (3) people usually get what they 
deserve based on their effort and skill.” Id. at 1304 
123  Id. at 1304–07.
124  Id. at 1348–49. “[C]laims of discrimination raise the specter of systemic deviations from meritocratic 
norms and thus trigger defensive responses.” Id. at 1350.
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Leave laws such as the FMLA may be less likely to trigger the unconscious, negative 
psychological responses of cultural cognition, and this is an alternative explanation for 
why leave laws have and may continue to experience more successful litigation outcomes 
than discrimination laws. In fact, Professor Eyer presents a detailed case on how “extra 
discrimination remedies (EDRs),” including the FMLA, avoid the negative psychological 
reactions common to discrimination claims.125 As she explains, laws such as the FMLA 
do not signal group-based discrimination and therefore avoid the threat to the value of 
meritocracy126 which can unconsciously undermine a plaintiff’s case.127 Moreover, to the 
extent leave laws such as the FMLA provide a more concrete standard for adjudication, 
these laws tap into a positive psychological phenomenon of decision-making that could 
lead to greater plaintiff success.128 Ultimately, Eyer concludes that to improve outcomes 
for victims of discrimination, plaintiffs must use the alternative approaches, such as the 
FMLA, that do not focus on protected class status.129
2. Limitations of Psychological Theory and Possible Evidence of Family 
Friendly Viewpoint
Cultural cognition offers a useful explanation for judicial behavior. In the context 
of the FMLA and other leave laws, however, the available studies only demonstrate the 
negative—the FMLA will not trigger as negative a response as anti-discrimination laws do. 
The case would be stronger with affirmative evidence that FMLA and similar laws actually 
inspire positive psychological responses in the judiciary. Some employment scholars have 
125  Eyer, supra note 3, at 1347 (“[T]he prototypes that judges and jurors have in relation to many EDRs are 
likely to be much more plaintiff-favorable than commonly held discrimination prototypes. Insofar as the work 
of psychology scholars suggests that such prototypes influence outcomes, EDRs are thus likely to be better 
situated than discrimination claims to prevail.”).
126  Id. at 1304. 
127  Id. at 1349–51.
128  Id. at 1350. “[P]sychology scholars have shown that well-defined and non-ambiguous constraints on 
decision-making . . . can be significantly more effective at constraining psychological biases . . . than the type 
of weak constraints found in discrimination laws.” Id. at 1350–51. The FMLA and leave laws are stronger 
constraints in the provisions that require distribution of benefits; while claims for retaliation for exercising 
benefit rights may not fall into this category due to the requirement of showing the employer’s intent in the 
latter claims. See Part.I.C.2, supra.
129  Eyer, supra note 3, at 1280. “[T]aking seriously the findings of psychology scholars, it seems likely 
that EDRs will be uniquely situated to avoid many of the obstacles to litigant success that are posed by the 
restrictive and widely shared public views regarding discrimination.” Id. at 1341 (discussing the use of “extra-
discrimination remedies” or “EDR” to address inequality in the workplace).
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suggested, albeit without empirical proof, that such positive responses exist and identify 
a positive effect of “family values” in FMLA cases. For example, although not explicitly 
citing the cultural cognition heuristic, Professor Katherine Silbaugh identifies evolving 
cultural norms as affecting case outcomes in FMLA cases. Although cautioning that the 
trend was modest, she posits that FMLA cases have had greater success in lower federal 
courts as the issue of work-life balance has become “domesticated,” that is, has moved 
beyond a feminist issue to a more “universal worker and family concern.”130 To strengthen 
this connection, Silbaugh presents evidence of a cultural shift on issues of work-family 
balance.131
Professor Joan Williams has similarly noted that certain “family responsibilities 
discrimination” or “FRD” cases succeed because they appeal to a broader range of 
values.132 “FRD is employment discrimination against people based on their caregiving 
responsibilities—whether for children, elderly parents, or ill partners.”133 FRD claims can 
be brought under various employment laws including the FMLA.134 “[One] reason for the 
success in FRD cases is that they are ‘family values’ cases that appeal to judges across the 
political spectrum, from liberal to conservative . . . . ”135 These examples, while compelling, 
would be stronger proof of the FMLA and leave laws’ ability to inspire positive judicial 
psychological response if paired with primary psychological studies documenting those 
responses. 
Ultimately, although based on evidence of what the leave laws do “not” do, the 
implications of cultural cognition theory are useful and informative. The FMLA and similar 
130  Silbaugh, supra note 16, at 198. 
131  Including changes in employer practices, changes in cultural awareness and changes in political 
discourse, among others. Silbaugh, supra note 16, at 208–10. In another example, Professor Katherine 
Silbaugh identified the way sexual harassment cases have succeeded by tapping into conservative justices’ 
values concerning proper workplace decorum. Id. at 214–15. “[S]exual harassment law came to be associated 
with . . . a clumsy substitute for manners . . . . The notion that extreme sexual harassment is as much offensive as 
it is discriminatory made it easier for judges to condemn.” Id. at 214. As conservative judges associated sexual 
harassment prohibitions with their own values on decency, they issued more decisions in plaintiff’s favor in 
these cases. Id. at 214–15. Silbaugh cautions that this phenomenon has negative implications. Id. at 215–16. 
132  Joan C. Williams & Stephanie Bornstein, Caregivers in the Courtroom: The Growing Trend of Family 
Responsibilities, 41 U.S. Fla. L. Rev. 171, 176 (2006).
133  Id. at 171. 
134  Id. at 185.
135  Id. at 176. 
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leave laws therefore have a basis for greater success than anti-discrimination laws because 
leave laws may not trigger the same negative cognitive response from decision-makers, 
and they may have a place within a broader range of values. Scholars have demonstrated 
the unconscious effect of cultural viewpoints and experiences on legal decisions. This 
cultural cognition plays a particularly strong role in employment law cases. Specifically, 
psychological studies demonstrate that protected class statutes such as Title VII provoke 
a distinct defensive responsive that makes it difficult for plaintiffs to succeed. In contrast, 
the FMLA, and by analogy other leave laws, do not implicate these unconscious negative 
reactions and appeal to a broader range of values. Thus, cultural cognition provides a useful 
theoretical basis for explaining the greater success of FMLA claims in comparison to anti-
discrimination claims.
C. Institutional Inequality: The Leave Laws Can Help Redefine the Ideal 
Worker
Both the political and psychological paradigms for judicial decision-making offer 
reasonable explanations for why the FMLA is more successful for plaintiffs than the highly 
unsuccessful anti-discrimination laws. A third construct, institutional inequality, offers 
yet another potentially useful explanation for the different outcomes. Professor Catherine 
Albiston explains that institutional inequality is the way workplace expectations, such 
as availability from nine a.m. to five p.m., five days a week, can limit the advancement 
of women and the disabled. Under the theory of institutional inequality, judges view 
workers who cannot meet these norms as unqualified rather than viewing these norms 
as unnecessarily excluding particular groups. Professor Albiston asserts that the FMLA 
and similar laws can overcome this restrictive force in judicial decisions by statutorily 
redefining the “normal” workplace requirements.136
For example, the FMLA modifies the work norm of full-time work availability to 
allow for time off to care for a sick family member. Under Albiston’s perspective, the 
FMLA is effective not because it is less ideological or more psychologically acceptable, but 
because it loosens the strict work requirements and expectations than can exclude women 
with caretaking responsibilities. Significantly, Albiston cites the same mechanism for the 
FMLA’s superior results as both the political and psychological theories: it is a benefit 
statute creating primary workplace rules, as opposed to protected class statute prohibiting 
individual intent-based decisions.137 
136  See generally, Albiston, supra note 1. 
137  Id. at 72–73, 134. 
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1. Institutional Inequality—The Ideal Worker is Defined and Normalized
According to Albiston, institutional inequality is the way that norms and expectations 
for the institution of work exclude certain groups, particularly women and the disabled.138 
Central to this phenomenon is the unchallenged premise that an ideal worker is available 
full time, year round, and provides uninterrupted labor.139 Under institutional norms, 
employers control both work schedules and how work is performed.140 Jobs or work that 
deviate from these norms are devalued; for example, part-time workers are excluded 
from benefit plans, or are paid less with less job security.141 This work culture limits the 
employment opportunities for those who cannot work regular schedules and often results 
in job loss for women and people with disabilities who need time off either to care for 
others or themselves.142
Work’s institutionalized time norms are so pervasively accepted that “differential 
treatment of nonstandard workers seems unproblematic, natural, and fair.”143 Thus for 
example, a court will reject the claim of a female worker who claims discriminatory 
termination if she is fired for the “legitimate” reason of excessive absences. The court 
will not consider that the absences were for childcare and will not question whether the 
employer could have accommodated those absences without harm to the business. This 
inequality is institutionalized because the underlying rule that has unequal effect is not 
subject to challenge.
As Albiston notes, feminist scholars have previously identified the pernicious effects 
of these unquestioned workplace ideals.144 For example, generally, for a worker to both 
138  Id. at 70.
139  Id. at 71. See also Williams & Bornstein, supra note 132, at 173–74 (“Workplace norms continue to be 
defined as they were generations ago—designed around men’s bodies and life patterns. From the employer’s 
perspective, the ideal worker is someone who works full time, year round for years on end, without career 
interruptions, and with no domestic or childcare responsibilities.”).
140  Albiston, supra note 1, at 32.
141  Id. at 32–33.
142  Id. at 72. “No matter how socially constructed they may be, conventional work practices have significant 
consequences for the economic and social status of women and people with disabilities.” Id. at 35.
143  Id. at 35.
144 Albiston, supra note 1, at 34. As have disability scholars. Id. “Recent social models of disability note 
that institutionalized work schedules presume that workers can work full time without periodic interruption. 
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have children and meet the time expectations of work, the worker must delegate childcare 
to another.145 Since women traditionally perform this caretaking role, work time norms 
assume and reinforce the traditional “solution” of gendered division of labor with men in 
the paid workforce and women providing unpaid labor at home.146 Consequently, women 
“disproportionately bear the losses that flow from deviating from standard work practices” 
in order to provide childcare, whether through the insecurity and lower pay of part-time 
status, inability to succeed or less success at full-time employment, or by working in the 
unpaid job of stay at home mother.147
2. Institutional Inequality and Anti-Discrimination Laws
As Albiston explains, courts solidify the harm of institutional inequality by adopting 
workplace time and presence norms in interpreting employment cases.148 Cases brought 
under anti-discrimination laws have been particularly susceptible to these confining 
judicial interpretations of work.149 “These cases indicate that as long as women seek equal 
access to work on its own terms, courts generally find in their favor. Challenges based on 
legal theories that implicitly or explicitly called into question time norms, however tend to 
produce doctrinal inconsistency and defeats for plaintiffs.”150
Albiston provides examples of cases under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (“PDA”), 
which is part of Title VII,151 where the employee misses work due to her pregnancy or 
Devaluing nonstandard labor also tends to disadvantage workers who have disabilities that limit when and how 
much they can work. Social models of disability reject how individualistic, medical models locate barriers to 
work within the individual rather than in the socially constructed features of their environment.” Id.
145  Id. Care for elderly or ill family members is similarly restricted. Id.
146  Id. 
147  Albiston, supra note 1, at 34. The structure of work also has harmful effects on men. Id. at 78 
(“[W]ork’s historically contingent characteristics organize employment-related and non-employment-related 
social life in ways that construct the meaning of gender for both men and women.”).
148  Id. at 70–71. (“Courts simply enforce the time standard of the full-time, punctual and always-ready 
worker despite legal reforms that attempt to change these practices when they exclude women, people with 
disabilities, and care-takers from the workplace.”).
149  “[W]orkplace time standards seem to be impervious to restructuring by antidiscrimination law.” Id. at 
70.
150  Id. at 80.
151  42 U.S.C. § 2000e.
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complications of pregnancy.152 She finds that “[c]hallenges to workplace practices encounter 
more difficulty when pregnancy causes working women to violate institutionalized time 
norms.”153 Courts in such cases have held that the PDA does not bar employers from firing 
these pregnant workers who must miss work unless the employer overlooks comparable 
absences of non-pregnant employees.154 When the employer follows typical work time 
norms, however, there often is no such example as all employees are simply expected 
to meet attendance requirements or risk termination.155 In this manner, courts accept as 
valid an employer’s use of restrictive time and attendance norms, leaving “no doctrinal 
opening to demonstrate that alleged work requirements may not be related to the job, or 
that alternatives exists that do not penalize pregnant workers.”156
As one specific example, Alibston cites to the case Dormeyer v. Comerica Bank-
Illinois, in which the plaintiff was terminated for absences due to morning sickness.157 In 
Dormeyer the Seventh Circuit reasoned that a plaintiff who could not meet the “legitimate 
requirements of the job,” namely, the attendance requirements, could not bring a legal 
challenge under Title VII. Thus, the court did not allow the plaintiff to use the theory that 
the attendance policy had a discriminatory disparate impact on women and simply found 
her termination to be legitimate. As Albiston and other scholars explain, an alternative 
approach is to ask: is the forty-hour, nine to five workweek itself discriminatory to women 
or people with disabilities, particularly if it is not actually necessary for the production/
outcomes employers seek.158 Courts, however, have not embraced this definition of 
discrimination, resulting in institutional inequality.159
152  Albiston, supra note 1, at 84.
153  Id. at 83.
154  Id. at 84.
155  Id. at 85 (“Typically in these cases, other workers are treated just as badly as pregnant women . . . ”).
156  Id. at 85–86.
157  Id. at 97.
158  Williams & Bornstein, supra note 132, at 174 (“If employers design good jobs around men’s bodies and 
life patterns—despite the fact that nearly half the workforce is women—that is sex discrimination.”).
159  Albiston, supra note 1, at 80. (“A close analysis of Title VII decisions reveals that courts have left 
little doctrinal room for challenging facially neutral work practices that nevertheless construct the meaning 
of gender . . . . These cases indicate that as long as women seek equal access to work on its own terms, courts 
generally find in their favor. Challenges based on legal theories that implicitly or explicitly called into question 
time norms, however, tend to produce doctrinal inconsistency and defeats for plaintiffs. Despite evidence that 
institutionalized time standards disproportionately disadvantage women, courts typically interpret the PDA and 
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3. Institutional Inequality and the FMLA
In contrast to anti-discrimination laws, the FMLA and similar leave laws have the 
potential to disrupt this pernicious aspect of institutional inequality. As Albiston explains, 
the solution to institutional inequality is to shift the focus “from who is protected by 
antidiscrimination statutes to what work should look like.”160 The FMLA and analogous 
leave laws do exactly what Albiston prescribes because they “focus on the structural 
features of work itself, rather than the identity of a class of persons protected by the law.”161 
As an example, the FMLA “restructures work time norms” of full-time work without 
significant absence by requiring job-protected, twelve weeks of leave for the arrival of a 
new child, care of a close relative or care for one’s own serious health condition.162 Leave 
laws thereby force employers to acknowledge their employee’s family responsibilities 
and, by providing leave on a gender neutral basis, challenge the implicit expectation that 
caring for family members is the responsibility of a worker’s at-home spouse, rather than 
the worker him/herself.163 This ultimately undermines the ideal worker standard and its 
inherent exclusionary effects.
The ability of leave laws to challenge the definition of the ideal worker means plaintiffs 
may be able to avoid some of the more successful defenses under anti-discrimination law. 
164 As Albiston explains, an employer’s usual attendance policies, evaluation criteria that 
considers absences, or policies against reduced work schedules cannot apply to employees 
Title VII to reinforce work’s culture of time.”).
160  Id. at 107.
161  Id. at 72–73, 134. (“Title VII and the ADA incorporate two different doctrinal models: an inequality 
model and an accommodation model, respectively. Title VII prohibits employers from treating workers 
differently on the basis of sex. The ADA not only prohibits discrimination, but also requires employers to 
accommodate workers’ disabilities. Both statutes, however, create rights that are based on workers’ identities. 
In contrast, the FMLA focuses directly on the characteristics of work. Rather than requiring equal treatment it 
creates a substantive right to up to 12 weeks of job-protected unpaid leave per year. In this way, it is more like 
legislation that creates job-protected leaves for jury duty or military service than anti-discrimination legislation. 
The FMLA’s structural approach offers more doctrinal avenues for interrogating workplace time norms built 
around historical conceptions of gender and disability.”).
162  Id. at 134.
163  Id. at 136–37.
164  Id. at 138 (“Situations that under Title VII or the ADA often resulted in no relief for workers have 
different outcomes under the FMLA.”). She cites two examples where pregnant employees were able to obtain 
FMLA leave because workplace conditions posed risks to their pregnancy. Id. at 138.
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who qualify for FMLA protection.165 Thus, as Albiston explains, by directly mandating leave 
benefits, the FMLA prevents courts from relying upon employer schedule preferences to 
dismiss a plaintiff’s claims.166 Similarly, mandated leave benefits avoid the confining equal 
treatment analysis under anti-discrimination laws. For example, Title VII permits employers 
to deny workers time off so long as the employer does so on an equal basis, which under 
standard norms leaves employees needing a different schedule without a legal claim. 167 
With the FMLA, however, the question is simply whether the employee received the benefit 
to which she or he was entitled, not what the standard practice is.168 In fact, “because leave 
is an entitlement rather than a discretionary benefit, an employer cannot defend against 
liability by simply asserting a legitimate business reason for denying leave,”169 whereas a 
legitimate business reason for an employment action is the lynchpin of employer defenses 
to anti-discrimination claims.170 Thus, Albiston identifies the transformative potential of 
leave laws stemming from their departure from the protected class paradigm. 
4. Limitations
Albiston acknowledges that the ability of the FMLA to challenge time norms is 
incomplete. She notes, for example, that the FMLA does not protect employees who 
change their schedule but do not reduce their work hours or take leave; which to a parent 
with specific hours of childcare availability can be just as crucial as time off of work.171 
Nor does the FMLA provide for pregnancy accommodation other than leave, which fails to 
protect women who are capable and want to work during their pregnancy but simply need 
accommodation in order to do so.172  
More significantly, Albiston also explains that institutional norms still influence 
165  Albiston, supra note 1, at 141.
166  Id. at 136.
167  Id. at 140.
168  Id. 
169  Id.
170  Gely & Chandler, supra note 20, at 168. 
171  Albiston, supra note 1, at 142. 
172  Id. at 142–43 (“[A]lthough the FMLA provides pregnancy disability leave, it does not require employers 
to structure work so that pregnant women can continue working during their pregnancies.”).
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decision-making in FMLA cases at least to some degree.173 In particular, the FMLA allows 
employees to sue for denial of benefits, but also for claims that the employer “discriminated” 
against the employee for exercising her FMLA leave rights.174 In this latter category of 
cases, the Gely/Chandler study found that employers are successful in raising the defense 
that the adverse employment actions against an employee occurred for reasons unrelated 
to the FMLA leave such as violation of work policies or poor performance.175 This defense 
implicates the ethos of employer control of the workplace and employee responsibility to 
meet these norms, i.e., as soon as protected leave is over, institutional inequality is in full 
effect.176
Overall, however, Albiston presents a useful theoretical framework for understanding 
why and how the FMLA, and by extension other leave laws, are or will be more successful 
than anti-discrimination laws. Although unable to completely escape the force of 
workplace norms, Albiston explains how the FMLA and analogous leave laws might do 
so to a much greater degree than anti-discrimination laws. “Courts may be more willing 
to challenge institutionalized time norms in FMLA actions because the FMLA advances 
a legal theory of reform based on minimum workplace standards, rather than prohibitions 
against discrimination.”177 Thus, legal reforms such as the FMLA that directly challenge 
173  Id. at 143.
174  Sperino, supra note 39, at 510.
175  Gely & Chandler, supra note 20, at 165 (“Employers were most successful when defending themselves 
against alleged FMLA violations by claiming either that adverse employment actions experienced by employees 
occurred for reasons unrelated to their leave.”). Employees succeeded in only thirty-five percent of cases in 
which the employer raised this defense. 
176  Id. at 160–61. “[T]he most common substantive defense [in FMLA claims] was that the adverse 
employment outcomes experienced by employees were not based on taking FMLA leave (sixty-three percent 
of the cases) . . . . The business justification defense serves an important goal for the employer. In particular, 
employers want to be able to protect their ability to manage employees with as little interference from the 
courts as possible.” In fact, Albiston analyzes a body of FMLA cases and finds that employers win a great 
majority of claims brought under the statute. Albiston, supra note 1, at 215–18. This is also consistent with 
the Gely/Chandler results. Gely & Chandler, supra note 20, at 163–64. Albiston further explains the “paradox 
of losing by winning” where cases that are strong for employees typically settle before reported decisions and 
employers as a collective interest, are repeat players with multiple opportunities to litigate the weaker cases to 
decision. See Albiston, supra note 1, at 193–99, 228. As a result, the body of case law on a rights statute such 
as the FMLA tends to be favorable to employers. Id. 
177  Albiston, supra note 1, at 240.
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norms, rather than prohibiting discrimination, are more likely to counteract institutional 
inequality.178 
III. Conclusions and Implications 
Legislative efforts to create workplace equality are inherently fraught with challenges. 
Political compromise shapes the laws, which are then placed in the hands of an entirely 
different branch of government for interpretation. It is at this latter stage of judicial decision-
making where hard-won legal reform can be stifled by restrictive interpretation. If reform 
through the political system is to remain the path of change, advocates and legislators must 
craft bills with an awareness and understanding of potential judicial responses. The greater 
case success rates of the FMLA in contrast to anti-discrimination laws is an example of 
potentially relevant judicial patterns that can guide legislative strategies. The reasons 
behind these different outcomes therefore become significant. Various theories of judicial 
decision-making offer political, psychological, or institutional explanations. Although 
based on different premises, each of these theories suggests that judges have a less hostile 
reaction to the neutral benefit nature of leave laws in contrast to protected class-based 
anti-discrimination laws. Ongoing efforts to expand leave can perhaps then be pursued 
with some hope that they will avoid the markedly low rate of plaintiff success that anti-
discrimination laws have experienced. Advocates can take this lesson in judicial outcomes 
to other contexts and design more effective legislative responses to inequality.
In fact, many of the recently proposed and enacted laws take this approach by mandating 
“family-friendly” benefits rather than prohibiting discrimination against particular classes 
of employees. For example, both federal and state legislators are seeking to pass laws 
providing for paid family leave to add to the FMLAs unpaid leave benefits.179 Not only do 
these laws use the more successful benefit structure of leave law, but they also particularly 
benefit low income workers who cannot afford time off without pay.180 Similarly, several 
states have passed laws providing for paid, short-term sick leave, which also mandate work 
benefits on a neutral basis rather than creating rights to sue based on status.181
In another key example, advocacy groups have proposed a federal Pregnant 
178  Id. at 239.
179  See Part I, supra.
180  Porter, supra note 12, at 340.
181  See Part I, supra. These sick leave laws also particularly benefit low-income and hourly wage employees.
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Workers’ Fairness Act (“PWFA”), which would require employers to provide reasonable 
accommodations to pregnant workers so long as they did not pose an undue hardship.182 
The PWFA would prohibit employers from forcing pregnant employees to take leave when 
an accommodation would allow them to keep their job.183 Advocates for the PWFA suggest 
these accommodations could include things as simple as allowing an employee to take 
breaks to hydrate, providing a chair to use while working, to more impactful changes such 
as allowing pregnant employees to temporarily modify their schedule or lower their lifting 
requirements.184
The PWFA embraces the direct benefit model of imposing workplace modifications. 
This contrasts with the existing Pregnancy Discrimination Act, which is part of Title 
VII. The PDA prohibits discrimination based on pregnancy status and has a much more 
limited accommodation requirement. Albiston noted the weaknesses of the PDA in 
particular; specifically, under the PDA employers are not affirmatively required to provide 
accommodations to pregnant employees, no matter how easy it would be to do so. Instead, 
under the PDA employees must only provide the same level of accommodation provided to 
other employees with short-term limitations. In the context of workplace norms that do not 
allow extensive absence, the PDA fails to ensure pregnancy is accommodated. 
The PWFA answers this specific weakness of the PDA by mandating benefits rather than 
requiring comparative status based equity. This difference should result in more positive 
judicial outcomes under the PWFA than the highly unsuccessful anti-discrimination laws. 
The statute will likely trigger less ideological responses, whether conscious viewpoint 
or unconscious cognitive illiberalism.185 Moreover, by reaching into the workplace to 
182  S. 942, 113th Cong. (2013).
183  Id. A number of states have recently enacted similar laws. A Better Balance, Pregnancy Protections 
for Workers in States and Localities Across the U.S., http://www.abetterbalance.org/web/images/stories/
State_and_Local_PWFA_List.userfriendly.clean.01.13.16_.pdf [https://perma.cc/9A3A-HK3N].
184  Nat’l Partnership, The Pregnant Worker’s Fairness Act, http://www.nationalpartnership.org/
research-library/workplace-fairness/pregnancy-discrimination/fact-sheet-pwfa.pdf [https://perma.cc/8V9W-
X4A6]. In contrast to current law, employers would be directly required to provide these accommodations 
regardless of whether other workers with similar temporary illnesses are also provided the benefits. Id. 
The PWFA would further direct the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to develop lists of model 
accommodations that should be provided in the absence of hardship. S. 942, 113th Cong. (2013).
185  Indeed, in a recent Supreme Court case, a number of conservative justices embraced the notion of 
pregnancy accommodation albeit in a more limited context. Young v. United Parcel Serv. Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1343 
(2015) did not involve a leave law, but rather discussed the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA) which is part 
of Title VII. The Supreme Court held that an employee may succeed under a claim of pregnancy discrimination 
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restructure expectations for employees, the PWFA circumvents judicially endorsed notions 
of “legitimate” work requirements that can structurally exclude women workers.186 Overall, 
this statute and the many similar efforts by advocates at the national, state, and municipal 
levels are poised to reach beyond the limitations of the anti-discrimination statutes to have 
a more meaningful impact on the lives of workers.
where the employer fails to accommodate pregnant workers in the same manner as it accommodates other 
workers’ inability to perform their tasks. Id. at 1361. Contrary to ideological expectations, this pro-employee 
outcome was supported by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito. Id. at 1356 (joined by liberal Justices Kagan, 
Sotomayor, Breyer, and Ginsburg). 
186  Albiston, supra note 1, at 97 (discussing the Doermeyer case). 
